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SINGULARLY PERTURBED PIECEWISE DETERMINISTIC GAMES∗
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Abstract. In this paper we consider a class of hybrid stochastic games with the piecewise open-
loop information structure. These games are indexed over a parameter ε which represents the time
scale ratio between the stochastic (jump process) and the deterministic (diﬀerential state equation)
parts of the dynamical system. We study the limit behavior of Nash equilibrium solutions to the
hybrid stochastic games when the time scale ratio tends to 0. We also establish that an approximate
equilibrium can be obtained for the hybrid stochastic games using a Nash equilibrium solution of a
reduced order sequential discrete state stochastic game and a family of local deterministic inﬁnite
horizon open-loop diﬀerential games deﬁned in the stretched out time scale. A numerical illustration
of this approximation scheme is also developed.
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1. Introduction. This paper deals with a class of piecewise deterministic sto-
chastic games where the stochastic jump process has a slower time scale than the
deterministic continuous time control systems that are deﬁned between successive
random jumps. These types of games may occur, for example, in imperfect com-
petition models where the deterministic subsystem describes the productive capital
accumulation of the ﬁrms competing on a market and where the market conditions are
subject to infrequent random switches that are inﬂuenced by the actions of the eco-
nomic agents. Situations where oligopolistic markets can be subject to abrupt modal
changes are observed, for example, in the energy sector or in the new technology or
telecommunication domains. Another interesting domain where this type of paradigm
could be used is the modeling of economic dimensions of climate change. The fast
modes would correspond to the competitive economic growth processes of diﬀerent
world economies, whereas the slow modes would be associated with diﬀerent climate
conditions. Indeed the transition from a climate mode to a diﬀerent one would be
inﬂuenced by the global emissions of greenhouse gases from all nations.
The information structure that we consider for these games is called piecewise
open-loop; it has been introduced in [7] and consists in playing open-loop controls
between successive jump times; the open-loop controls are adapted to the history
of jump times and system states observed at jump times. It has been recognized
that these piecewise deterministic games, when played under the piecewise open-loop
information structure, are akin to the general class of stochastic sequential games
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with general (Borel) action and state spaces, considered in particular in [17] and [15],
where existence and approximation of Nash equilibria have been studied. We also
suppose that the players have separated deterministic dynamics and are linked only
through the payoﬀ rewards at that level. This means that between two successive
modal changes each player j = 1, . . . ,m selects a deterministic trajectory xj(·) that
has a given initial state determined by the state at the time of the ﬁrst jump and
which will be in force until the second jump occurs. We assume that the m state
variables xj , j = 1, . . . ,m, together inﬂuence the jump rates of the discrete modal
stochastic process.
The aim of this paper is to develop a theory of approximation for a Nash equi-
librium solution to this class of diﬀerential games when the time scale ratio between
the (continuous) deterministic and (jump) stochastic dynamics tends to 0. This is the
realm of singular perturbation theory in control. In [6] one can ﬁnd a rather complete
theory of singularly perturbed piecewise deterministic control systems and an illustra-
tion of the role played by “turnpikes” (i.e., global attractors for optimal trajectories in
inﬁnite horizon control problems) in the deﬁnition of the “limit control problem.” The
initial objective of this paper was to explore the possibility of extending the results
obtained in [6] to the case of piecewise open-loop Nash equilibria. As is often the case
when one passes from a single optimizer control formalism to the context of dynamic
games with a Nash equilibrium solution, these results cannot be readily generalized,
and we obtain substantially diﬀerent and weaker limit theorems.
In the present paper we consider only the case of inﬁnite horizon hybrid games
with discounted payoﬀs. In brief the contribution of this paper can be stated as
follows: (i) We deﬁne, in the slow time scale, a limit game problem in the form of
a controlled Markov chain. A Nash equilibrium for this limit game, if it exists, will
serve to build an approximate equilibrium solution of the original game. (ii) We prove
that given a Nash equilibrium for the limit game, deﬁned in terms of attractors for the
players xj(·)-trajectories, one can construct a ς-equilibrium for any Gε game, where
ε is small enough by using strategies characterized by a uniform attractor property.
(iii) Having solved the limit Nash game, we can use the associated potential function
to characterize a set of local inﬁnite horizon open-loop games, whose Nash equilibria
satisfy the uniform attractor property. (iv) We thus derive a decomposition principle
for this class of games and illustrate it on a numerical example.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we recall the deﬁnition of a piece-
wise deterministic game played with piecewise open-loop strategies; in section 3 we
study the limit game when the time scale ratio ε between fast and slow modes tends
to 0; in section 4 we propose a method to construct a ς-equilibrium solutions for the
hybrid game, using uniform attractor policies; in section 5 we study a class of local
open-loop games for which the Nash equilibrium strategies satisfy the uniform attrac-
tor property; in section 6 we derive from these results a decomposition principle; and
in section 7 we provide a numerical illustration of these limit properties and sketch
an economic model of climate change policies having this two–time scale structure; in
section 8 we summarize what has been achieved.
2. A class of piecewise deterministic games. In this section we deﬁne the
class of dynamic games that are considered in this work. They are particular instances
of piecewise deterministic games, as introduced in [7]. We use both a formalism of
control systems and a formalism of calculus of variations, very much in the same way
as in [4], where the so-called turnpike property for open-loop diﬀerential games with
decoupled dynamics was established.
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2.1. The dynamics. Consider m players, denoted j ∈ M = {1, . . . ,m}, con-
trolling a system that has p discrete modes denoted i ∈ I = {0, . . . , p−1}. Each player
j ∈M also controls her own dynamical subsystem with mode-dependent dynamics,
εx˙j(t) = f
i
j(xj(t), uj(t)),(2.1)
uj(t) ∈ U ij ⊂ νj ,(2.2)
xj(t) ∈ Xj ⊂ nj ,(2.3)
where the control sets U ij are compacts and the state sets Xj are bounded. The
functions f ij(xj , uj) are supposed to satisfy the usual regularity assumptions made in
control theory. Here ε is a parameter that will eventually be very small. We denote
x = (xj : j ∈ M) ∈ X and u = (uj : j ∈ M) ∈ U to be the state and control vectors,
respectively.
The “mode” dynamics is represented by a continuous time jump process ξ(·), with
state set I and transition rates
qk(x(t)) = lim
dt→0
1
dt
P[ξ(t+ dt) =  | ξ(t) = k, x(t)], k,  ∈ I, x(t) ∈ X,
that depend on the trajectory choice made by all players. Indeed we assume qk(x) ≥ 0
if k =  and qkk(x) = −
∑
 =k qk(x). As usual we introduce the notation
qk(x)=˙
∑
 =k
qk(x).
Remark 1. The parameter ε represents the time scale ratio. Its inverse 1/ε is
therefore a speed of adjustment factor for the deterministic part of the hybrid system;
when ε→ 0 the deterministic part of the system is allowed to adjust much faster than
the stochastic jumps occurrences.
It will be convenient to use a calculus of variations formalism, obtained in the
following way: We assume that at time t the reward rate to Player j, when the mode
is i, is given by a function Lij(x(t), uj(t)) which is C
1 in x and continuous in uj . Let
F ij (zj , xj) = {uj ∈ U ij : zj = f ij(xj , uj)} be the set of controls for Player j that yield
a velocity zj at state xj . We introduce a function Lij(x, zj) that associates a value in
 ∪ {−∞} with every x ∈ Πml=1Xl ⊂ n, n =
∑
j∈M nj , and zj ∈ nj as follows:
Lij(x, zj) =
{ −∞ if xj /∈ Xj or F ij (zj , xj) = ∅;
sup{Lij(x, uj) : uj ∈ F ij (zj , xj)} otherwise.(2.4)
We can now consider a dynamic game where each player j ∈M = {1, . . . ,m} controls
an absolutely continuous trajectory xj(·) with state xj(t) ∈ Xj at time t ∈ [0,∞),
where Xj is a compact subset in nj .
The game is played as follows: at jump times τ0 = 0, τ1, . . . , τν , . . . of the ξ(·)
process the players observe the state of the system, i.e., the pair sν = (ξν , xν), where
ξν = ξ(τν) and xν = x(τν). Then Player j selects an absolutely continuous function
yj : [0,∞) → Xj , with initial condition yj(0) = xνj . The trajectory for Player j will
thus be deﬁned, between jump times τν and τν+1, by xj(t) = yj(t− τν). We denote
by Xj the class of admissible functions yj : [0,∞) → Xj that serve to deﬁne the
action set of Player j. A piecewise open-loop strategy for Player j is then deﬁned as
a mapping γj : (τ
ν , sν) → Xj .
At time t the reward rate to Player j is given by Lξ(t)j (x(t), εx˙j(t)) and depends
on the current mode ξ(t), the state vector x(t) = (xj(t))j∈M , and the time derivative
x˙j(·) of Player j’s own trajectory multiplied by the time scale ratio ε.
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2.2. The hybrid game Gε. We call hybrid game Gε the game in normal form
where the players select piecewise open-loop strategies as deﬁned above and obtain
payoﬀs deﬁned as follows:
Let ρj be the discount rate of Player j. Associated with a strategy m-tuple
γ = {γj : j ∈M} the payoﬀs to the players are given by
V εj (γ; i, x
o) = Eγ
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρjtLξ(t)j (x(t), εx˙j(t)) dt | (ξ(t0) = i, x(t0) = xo
]
j ∈M, (i, xo) ∈ I ×X,(2.5)
where Eγ is the expectation given the probability measure induced by the strategy
vector γ.
Definition 2.1. (i) A strategy m-tuple γ∗ is a ς-equilibrium, with ς ≥ 0 given,
if
V ε∗j (i, x
o) = V εj (γ
∗; i, xo) ≥ V εj ([γ∗M−j , γj ]; i, xo)− ς ∀γj ∈ Γj
j ∈M, (i, xo) ∈ I ×X,(2.6)
where [γ∗
M−j , γj ] denotes the strategy vector obtained from γ
∗ when only Player j
unilaterally changes her strategy to γj.
(ii) A 0-equilibrium is also called a Nash equilibrium.
The reader will note that we distinguish between ε > 0, which is the time scale
ratio, and ς > 0, which is the approximation used in the equilibrium conditions.
Indeed, when ε becomes very small this game will become ill-conditioned. In the
rest of the paper we propose an approach for deﬁning a limit game which is easier to
solve and which can be used to construct approximate equilibria of the original game
when ε is small.
3. The limit game G0. In this section we introduce the so-called limit game
G0, which is deﬁned as a multiagent controlled Markov chain with states in I and
controls in Xij , i ∈ I, j ∈M .
3.1. A discrete-state Markov game. The limit game G0 is deﬁned as a con-
trolled Markov chain on the discrete set I where Player j’s strategy is deﬁned by a
vector x˜j = (x
i
j : i ∈ I) with xij ∈ Xj , j ∈ M . The controlled transition rates of the
Markov chain are given by qk,(x
k), where we use the notation xk = (xkj : j ∈ J).
The payoﬀ for Player j, when the game starts in state i and when the players use the
strategy m-tuple x˜ = (x˜j : j ∈M), is deﬁned as follows:
Vj(x˜; i) = Ex˜
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρjtLξ(t)j (xξ(t), 0) dt | ξ(0) = i
]
.(3.1)
3.2. Nash equilibrium in the limit game. We assume the following.
Assumption 1. There exists an equilibrium x˜∗ for the limit game. The equilib-
rium value function for Player j is given by
V ∗j (i) = max
x˜j
Ex˜
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρjtL∗ξ(t)j ([x∗ξ(t)M−j , x∗ξ(t)j ], 0) dt | (ξ(0) = i
]
,
i ∈ I, j ∈M,(3.2)
for each player j.
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The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) system of equations associated with this
equilibrium is
ρjV
∗
j (i) = max
xi
j
∈Xj
Lij([x∗iM−j , xij ], 0) +
∑
k∈I
qik([x
∗i
M−j , x
i
j ])V
∗
j (k), i ∈ I, j ∈M.(3.3)
Remark 2. The existence of an equilibrium for a sequential game has been proved
in particular in [15] and [17]. A more general theory that covers the class of stochastic
games considered here has been proposed in [2]. These theories could be applied to
prove that a Nash equilibrium exists for the limit game. However, the assumption
is more restrictive since it assumes that the equilibrium can be obtained in pure
strategies.
3.3. Occupation measures. It will be convenient to use occupation measures
to prove the main convergence results in the paper. Introducing the indicator function
δ(i, k) =
{
1 if i = k,
0 otherwise,
(3.4)
we deﬁne, for any strategym-tuple x˜ and state k, given the initial state i, with k, i ∈ I,
the occupation measures
Πkj (x˜, i) = Ex˜
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρjtδ(k, ξ(t)) dt | ξ(0) = i
]
.(3.5)
For each j ∈M these occupation measures satisfy the coupled equations
ρjΠ

j(x˜; i)−
∑
k∈I
qki(x
k)Πkj (x˜; i) = δ(, i), i ∈ I.(3.6)
We can also rewrite the payoﬀ, given in (3.1), as
Vj(x˜; i) =
∑
k
Πkj (x˜; i)Lkj (xk, 0).(3.7)
4. Uniform attractor policies and ς-equilibria. One can make a change of
time scale in the dynamical system (2.1)–(2.3) by introducing a stretched out time
τ = tε . We shall assume a uniform reachability condition in this extended time scale.
Assumption 2. In the stretched out time scale (or when ε = 1), for any η > 0
and mode i ∈ I, any target state xf in X can be reached within η by the dynamical
system (2.1)–(2.3) from any initial state xo ∈ X in a uniformly bounded time. We
call θ(η) the uniform bound on the η-reachability time. In summary we assume the
following:
∀η > 0, ∃θ(η) > 0 s.t. ∀i ∈ I, ∀xo and xf ∈ X, there exists a
trajectory x(·) s.t. x(0) = xo, Lij(x(t), x˙j(t)) < ∞, j ∈ M a.e. and
∀t > θ(η) ‖x(t)− xf‖ < η holds.
We shall further assume that this reachability is achieved through the use of
“admissible decentralized system behavior.”
Definition 4.1. An admissible decentralized system behavior is a family of map-
pings sij(xj) taking values in nj , i ∈ I, j ∈ J , and such that the diﬀerential equa-
tions x˙j(t) = s
i
j(xj(t)) admit a uniquely deﬁned solution in Xj for t ∈ [0,∞), given
x(0) = xo ∈ Xj and such that Lij(x(t), sij(xj(t))) > −∞ a.e. on [0,∞).
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Assumption 3. The uniform reachability Assumption 2 is achieved by a set of
admissible decentralized system behavior sij(xj ;x
o, xf ) = x˙j such that
Lij(x, sij(xj ;xo, xf )) <∞ and sij(xfj ;xo, xf ) = 0.
Remark 3. The notion of admissible decentralized system behavior is closely
related to the concept of decentralized feedback control laws in the state equation
formulation of the dynamical system.
We also make the following continuity assumption, which should be not too re-
strictive.
Assumption 4. The control laws of admissible decentralized system behavior have
the following continuity property:
lim
x→xf
sij(xj ;x
o, x) = sij(x
f
j ;x
o, xf ) = 0.(4.1)
4.1. A correspondence mapping. Given a strategy x˜ for the limit game G0,
we associate a strategy γ˜ε = σε(x˜) for the Gε game deﬁned as follows: For any discrete
state i ∈ I and any initial state xo select the trajectory xi(·) : [0,∞) → X, where
each component xj(t) is a solution of s
i
j(xj(t);x
o, x˜) = εx˙j(t) with x
i
j(0) = x
o
j . This
is always possible by Assumption 3, and the following holds:
∀η > 0,∃θ(η) s.t. ‖xij(t)− xij‖ < η ∀j ∈M ∀t ≥ θ(η)ε.(4.2)
Deﬁne the occupation measures associated with γ˜ε in the Gε game
Πkεj (γ˜
ε; i, xo) = Eγ˜ε
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρjtδ(k, ξ(t)) dt | (ξ(0) = i, x(0)) = xo
]
.(4.3)
For any function g(x) which is continuous the asymptotic reachability condition (4.2)
implies that there exits θ′(η) such that
|g(xi(t))− g(xi)| < η ∀t ≥ θ′(η)ε.(4.4)
For the sake of simplifying the notation we shall use simply θ instead of θ′(η) when
there is no possibility of confusion. We can now prove the following.
Proposition 4.2. For any i ∈ I and any xo ∈ X the following convergence holds
for the occupation measures:
lim
ε→0
∣∣Πkj (x˜; i)−Πkεj (σε(x˜); i, xo)∣∣ = 0.(4.5)
Proof. The detailed proof, which is straightforward but lengthy, is given in Ap-
pendix A. We summarize here its general development. As δ(i, k) is an indicator
function it is uniformly bounded and one has for any strategy γ for a game Gε
Eγ
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρtδ(i, ξ(t)) dt
]
= lim
T→∞
Eγ
[∫ T
0
e−ρtδ(i, ξ(t)) dt
]
,(4.6)
and this convergence is uniform for all γ and ε. For any realization, the integral∫ T
0
e−ρtδ(i, ξ(t, ω)) dt can be shown to be a continuous function of the sample path
ξ(t, ω) in an appropriate norm d(·) (see Appendix A). Then to establish (4.5) it suﬃces
to show that the weak convergence limit
Pε[σ
ε(x˜)]⇒ P [x˜](4.7)
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holds, where Pε[σ
ε(x˜)] and P [x˜] are the probability measures induced on the restric-
tion of the sample space to functions deﬁned over the interval [0, T ] by σε(x˜) and x˜
for the games Gε and G0, respectively.
Applying1 Theorem 15.4 from [1] we can say that the weak convergence property
(4.7) holds if, for any ﬁnite set of sample times t1, . . . , tp, the probability measures in-
duced on the p random variables ξ(t1), . . . , ξ(tp) by the strategy σ
ε(x˜) converge weakly
to the probability measure induced by the limit game strategy x˜. We summarize this
by the expression
Pεπ
−1
t1,...,tp ⇒ Pπ−1t1,...,tp ,(4.8)
where π−1t1,...,tp is the inverse image of the projection of the ξ(·) process on the p
sample times. This property is shown to hold in the rest of the proof presented in the
appendix.
The next result will establish convergence for the payoﬀ functionals.
Proposition 4.3. For any strategy x˜ of the limit game G0 the following holds
true:
lim
ε→0
∣∣V εj (σε(x˜); i, xo)− Vj(x˜; i)∣∣ = 0 ∀i ∈ I.(4.9)
Proof. Consider the sample paths of the process {(ξ(·, ω), x(·, ω)) : [t,∞) →
I ×n : ω ∈ Ω} generated by a strategy γ˜ε = σε(x˜). Almost surely any sample path
has a countable number of jump times denoted tl(ω), l = 0, . . . ,∞. The following
holds true:
Eγ˜ε
[ ∞∑
l=0
e−ρjtl
]
≤M.(4.10)
Therefore we can write
V εj (γ˜
ε;xo, i) = Eγ˜ε
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρjtLξ(t)j (x(t), x˙j(t)) dt | x(0) = xo; ξ(0) = i
]
= Eγ˜ε
[ ∞∑
l=0
∫ tl+1
tl
e−ρjtLξlj (x(t), x˙j(t)) dt | x(0) = xo; ξ(0) = i
]
= Eγ˜ε
[ ∞∑
l=0
∫ tl+1
tl
e−ρjtLξlj (xξl , 0) dt
+
∞∑
l=0
∫ min{tl+εθ,tl+1}
tl
e−ρjt
(
Lξlj (x(t), x˙j(t))− Lξlj (xξl , 0)
)
dt
+
∞∑
l=0
∫ tl+1
min{tl+εθ,tl+1}
e−ρjt
(
Lξlj (x(t), x˙j(t))− Lξlj (xξl , 0)
)
dt
| x(0) = xo; ξ(0) = i
]
.(4.11)
1For continuous time Markov chains the condition (15.11) in [1] holds as the probability of having
more than one jump in an interval [t, t + δ] tends to zero as δ tends to zero. Furthermore the set of
trajectories that have a jump at t = T has a zero measure. Therefore we can apply Theorem 15.4
from [1].
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As Lij is bounded in X × Uj , the second term in (4.11) tends to zero as ε tends to
zero. As Lij is continuous, the last term in (4.11) can be made as small as desired as ε
tends to zero. It remains to show that the ﬁrst term in (4.11) tends to Vj(x˜; i) when
ε tends to zero, to conclude that (4.9) holds. Since
Eγ˜ε
[ ∞∑
l=0
∫ tl+1
tl
e−ρjtLξlj (xl, 0) dt | x(0) = xo; ξ(0) = i
]
=
∑
k∈I
Πk(γ˜ε; i, xo)Lkj (xk, 0),(4.12)
the result holds true by Proposition 4.2.
4.2. The auxiliary ε-control problems. Given the strategy σε(x˜) in the game
Gε and an initial state xo, we deﬁne for each player j ∈ M an auxiliary ε-control
problem as follows:
W εj (γ
ε
j ; i, x
o|σε(x˜)) = Eγj
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρjtLξ(t)j (x(t), uj(t)) dt | ξ(0) = i, x(0) = xo
]
,(4.13)
where the Markov jump process ξ(·) is still characterized by jump rates qk(x(t)) and
the state equations in mode k ∈ I are
εx˙j(t) = f
k
j (xj(t), uj(t)),(4.14)
εx˙(t) = s
k
 (x(t);x
k, x˜) if  = j.(4.15)
In the equations above (k, xk) = (ξ(tk+), x(tk+)) is the state of the system right after
the last jump time and sk (x(t);x
k, x˜) is the admissible decentralized system behavior
associated with strategy σε(x˜) for Player . This control problem for Player j is thus
obtained by ﬁxing the dynamics of the other players to their admissible decentralized
system behavior, and therefore the following holds:
W εj (γ
ε
j ; i, x
o | σε(x˜)) = V εj ([σεM−j(x˜), γεj ]; i, xo).(4.16)
Using these auxiliary control problems we will be able to exploit existing results from
the theory of singularly perturbed systems, in particular those established in [6].
4.3. The auxiliary limit-control problem. For a given x˜ and for a given set
of potential vectors w˜j = (w
i
j)i∈I for each player j, deﬁne the Hamiltonians
Hij(w˜j ; x˜) = max
xj ,uj
{
Lij([x˜
i
−j , xj ], uj) +
∑
k∈I
qik(x˜
i
−j , xj)w
i
j | s.t. f ij(xj , uj) = 0
}
.
For each player j we consider then the solution of the algebraic equations
ρjw
i∗
j = H
i
j(w˜
∗
j ; x˜), i ∈ I.(4.17)
Note that these problems, for all j ∈M , correspond to the solution of the limit game
introduced in section 3, with the HJB equations given in (3.3).
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4.4. Convergence of the auxiliary ε-control problem. These control prob-
lems have been studied in [6], where the following convergence result is established.
Theorem 4.4. Let the assumptions of Theorems 3 and 4 in [6] be satisﬁed (see
Appendix B for a reminder of these assumptions). Let γε∗j be the optimal strategy in
the ε-control problem and let v∗j be the optimal control in the limit-control problem;
then there exists a constant C such that∣∣W εj (γε∗j ; i, xo | σε(x˜∗))− wi∗j ∣∣ ≤ Cε α1+α .(4.18)
Remark 4. Notice that we have wi∗j = Vj(x˜
∗; i) = V ∗j (i).
4.5. Convergence of the ε-game. We can now establish the following result.
Theorem 4.5. Let x˜∗ be an equilibrium in the limit game G0. Then for all
positive ς there exists ε0 such that for all 0 < ε ≤ ε0, the strategy m-tuple σε(x˜∗)
deﬁnes a ς-Nash equilibrium for the game Gε.
Proof. Let x˜∗ be an equilibrium in the limit game. Let γεj be a strategy for Player
j in the game Gε. Given σεM−j(x˜
∗), let γε∗j be the optimal strategy in the ε-control
problem.
Given ς, there exist ε0 such that for ε < ε0 we have
V εj ([σ
ε
M−j(x˜
∗), γεj ]; i, x
o) = W εj (γ
ε
j ; i, x
o | σε(x˜∗))(4.19)
≤W εj (γε∗j ; i, xo | σε(x˜∗))(4.20)
≤ Vj(x˜∗; i) + ς/2(4.21)
≤ V εj (σε(x˜∗); i, xo) + ς.(4.22)
The ﬁrst equality is valid by deﬁnition. The ﬁrst inequality comes from the fact that
γε∗j is the optimal strategy in the ε-control problem. The second inequality comes from
Theorem 4.4 and Remark 4. The last inequality comes from Proposition 4.3.
We have thus proved that the correspondence mapping introduced in section 4.1
tends to deﬁne an approximate Nash equilibrium when the time scale ratio tends to 0.
5. The local inﬁnite horizon open-loop games. We have established that a
correspondence mapping based on a property of uniform reachability of steady states
deﬁnes an approximate equilibrium for the Gε game when ε is small. We can now
go one step further and show that such a correspondence mapping can be obtained
from the equilibrium solutions of a class of local inﬁnite horizon open-loop diﬀerential
games (IHOLDGs), with the overtaking optimality criterion.
Let V ∗j (i) : i ∈ I be the potential function associated with Player j in the equilib-
rium solution for the limit game. For any discrete state i and initial continuous state
x(0) = xo deﬁne in the stretched out time scale the open-loop diﬀerential game with
rewards over the time interval [0, θ) given by
JΘj [x
o;x(·)] =
∫ Θ
0
{
Lij(x(τ), x˙j(τ)) +
∑
∈I
qi(x(τ))V
∗
j ()
}
dτ, j ∈M,(5.1)
where each player j selects an absolutely continuous trajectory {xj(τ) : τ ≥ 0} with
xj(0) = x
o
j .
Definition 5.1. An overtaking equilibrium for the open-loop game deﬁned by the
payoﬀ functionals (5.1) is an M -trajectory (x∗(τ), τ ≥ 0) such that, for each player
j ∈M and trajectory (xj(τ), τ ≥ 0) the following holds:
lim inf
Θ→∞
(
JΘj [x
o;x∗(·)]− JΘj [xo; [x∗−j(·), xj(·)]]
) ≥ 0.(5.2)
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Assumption 5. The jump rates qi(x) are aﬃne in x. The reward rates Lij(x, zj)
are concave in xj and uj for each j ∈M and satisfy globally the following condition,
also called “strict diagonal concavity” in [16] and [4]:
∀xa, xb ∈ X, xa = xb
∀ζaj ∈ ∂xjLij(xa, zj), ζbj ∈ ∂xjLij(xa, zj),∑
j∈M
(ζaj − ζbj )(xaj − xbj) > 0.(5.3)
Under this assumption we can establish the following.
• An overtaking equilibrium for this game exists and is unique. It is character-
ized by a “turnpike,” which is an attractor for all the equilibrium trajectories
emanating from diﬀerent initial states xo.
• This attractor corresponds to the equilibrium control associated with i ∈ I
in the limit game.
• From the overtaking equilibrium solutions to these open-loop games deﬁned
for all i ∈ I and all initial state xo we can construct an approximate (ς)
equilibrium for the hybrid game problem.
The existence and uniqueness results with the turnpike property have been proved in
[4]. The correspondence between the turnpikes and the equilibrium solutions in the
limit game is easily obtained in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. The turnpike attractor for the IHOLDG deﬁned in (5.1) coincides
with the equilibrium solution to the limit game.
The existence and uniqueness results with the turnpike property have been proved
in Carlson and Haurie [4]. The correspondence between the turnpikes and the equi-
librium solution in the limit game is easily obtained in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3. The turnpike attractor for the open-loop game deﬁned in (5.1) co-
incides with the equilibrium solution to the limit game.
Proof. Introduce for each player j ∈ M the Hamiltonians Hi : n × nj →
∪ {−∞} deﬁned as
Hi(x, pj) = sup
zj
{
Lij(x, zj) +
∑
∈I
qi(x)V
∗
j () + pjzj
}
.(5.4)
If x∗(·) is an overtaking equilibrium at xo, then there exists, for each player j ∈ M ,
an absolutely continuous function p∗j (·) such that
x˙j(t) ∈ ∂pjHi(x∗(t), p∗j (t)),(5.5)
p˙j(t) ∈ −∂xjHi(x∗(t), p∗j (t)).(5.6)
The turnpike is a solution of
0 ∈ ∂pjHi(x¯i, p¯ij),(5.7)
0 ∈ −∂xjHi(x¯i, p¯ij),(5.8)
j ∈M.(5.9)
Under the strict diagonal concavity assumption there exists a unique solution to (5.7)–
(5.8), and any solution to (5.5)–(5.6) which remains bounded is such that
lim
t→∞x
∗(t) = x¯i, lim
t→∞ p
∗
j (t) = p¯
i
j , j ∈M.
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Now it is an easy matter to check that the conditions (5.7)–(5.8) correspond to the
suﬃcient optimality conditions for the problem
max
xi
j
[
Lij([x∗iM−j , xij ], 0) +
∑
∈I
qi([x
∗i
M−j , x
i
j ])V
∗
j ()
]
, j ∈M,(5.10)
which is also the right-hand side for mode i of the HJB equations in the limit game.
Therefore the unique turnpike deﬁnes also an equilibrium in the limit game G0.
It is established, in the theory of turnpikes for inﬁnite horizon control or open-loop
equilibrium problems under the overtaking optimality criterion that the uniform ς-
reachability condition is satisﬁed by the trajectories converging toward their respective
attractors; see the book [5] for a complete discussion of these topics. In order to link
these trajectories with a ς-equilibrium of the Gε game we need this last assumption.
Assumption 6. In mode i, the overtaking trajectories of Player j, emanating
from diﬀerent initial states xoj , can be synthesized, i.e., they are obtained as solutions
to a system of state equations
x˙j(t) = f
i
j(xj(t), μ
∗i
j (xj(t))); xj(0) = x
o,(5.11)
where μ∗ij (·) is an admissible and continuous decentralized feedback law.
We can summarize the developments in the following.
Proposition 5.4. Given the potential functions associated with the Nash equi-
librium of the limit game G0, one can construct a family of IHOLDGs, with payoﬀs
deﬁned in (5.1). If Assumptions 5 and 6 are satisﬁed, the Nash equilibria of these
IHOLDGs, under the overtaking optimality criterion, deﬁne a piecewise open-loop
strategy for the Gε game which is a ς-equilibrium if ε is small enough.
Proof. It suﬃces to apply Theorem 4.5 with a strategy m-tuple σε(x˜∗) obtained
from the admissible decentralized system behavior (5.11).
6. A decomposition principle. The result obtained can be interpreted as a
decomposition principle for this two–time scale game. At a higher level one solves the
limit stochastic game G0 and one obtains for each player an equilibrium steady state
x˜j and an equilibrium potential function V
∗
j (k)) : k ∈ I. These potential functions
are transmitted to all players. The Gε game is then played as follows:
At a jump time to of the process ξ(·), the players observe the state
(ξ(to+), x(to+)) = (i, xi). Making a time translation to get to = 0,
the players solve an IHOLDG where for each player j ∈M the payoﬀ
is deﬁned for any Θ > 0 by
JΘj [x
o;x(·)] =
∫ Θ
0
{
Lij(x(τ), x˙j(τ)) +
∑
∈I
qi(x(τ))V
∗
j ()
}
dτ.
The players ﬁnd the unique Nash overtaking equilibrium for this open-
loop game and they follow this trajectory, as long as the jump process
remains in state i.
This way of playing the game is close to being a piecewise open-loop Nash equilibrium
when the time scale ratio ε is small.
7. Examples. In this section we provide two illustrations of the application of
the theory developed above. The ﬁrst one is a complete numerical computation real-
ized on a dynamic duopoly model. In this example one shows how one can easily solve
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the diﬀerent dynamic games used in this approximation theory. The second illustra-
tion is the reformulation as an hybrid stochastic system of a well-known integrated
assessment model of climate change with noncooperative behavior of the economic
agents (groups of nations). The stochastic jump process represents modiﬁcations in
climate modes. The complete development and exploitation of this model would take
too much space and will be the subject of another article. We nevertheless indi-
cate how the theory of approximation developed herein would permit an important
simpliﬁcation in the type of game to solve.
7.1. A simple numerical example. As a complete illustrative example, let
us ﬁrst consider a simple but nontrivial model and compute the equilibrium turnpike
values of the limit game and the equilibrium trajectories of the local IHOLDG that
exhibit the turnpike property. We consider a duopoly (M = {1, 2}) with two slow
market modes (I = {0, 1}).
The fast economic dynamics is deﬁned by the state equations that describe the
accumulation of production capacities (xj) through investment (uj) by the two ﬁrms
f ij(xj , uj) = u
i
j − xij , i ∈ I, j ∈M.(7.1)
The slow dynamics is described by the two transition rates between market modes
q01(x) = x
0
1 + x
0
2,(7.2)
q10(x) = 1,(7.3)
and ξ(0) = 0. Typically mode ξ = 0 would represent a “strong” market and mode ξ =
1 would represent a “depressed” market. The transition from strength to depression is
inﬂuenced by the total supply on the market. The return from depression to strength
is random and not controlled.
The reward functions are the ﬁrms’ proﬁts expressed as Lij(x, u) = a
i
jx
i
j−(uij)2. A
common discount rate is ﬁxed at ρj = ρ = 0.05. Payoﬀs are total expected discounted
rewards over an inﬁnite time horizon.
This dynamic duopoly model is similar (it has normalized parameter values) to
the model proposed in [9], where a theory of stochastic duopoly with modal jumps is
developed and a numerical solution method is proposed. We shall solve now the limit
game problem and the local IHOLDGs for this singularly perturbed dynamic game.
7.1.1. Solving the limit game. In that particular case, it is possible to ﬁnd
an explicit solution to (3.6). Using Maple we obtain the following expressions for the
occupation measures:
Π0j (0; x˜) =
(1 + ρ)
ρ(1 + ρ+ x01 + x
0
2)
,(7.4)
Π1j (0; x˜) =
x01 + u
0
2
ρ(1 + ρ+ x01 + x
0
2)
.(7.5)
Now using the expression (3.7) for the payoﬀs associated with the strategy x in
the limit game G0, we reduce the search for a Nash equilibrium to the solution of a
variational inequality which can be solved with an algorithm given by Konnov [11].
The results are displayed in Table 7.1, which provides the equilibrium steady state
values for diﬀerent sets of parameters aij used in the reward function. These steady
state values, provided by the equilibrium solutions of the limit game, indicate the
target production capacity to which the duopolists should aim depending on the
prevailing market mode.
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Table 7.1
Equilibrium policy for diﬀerent values of aij .
a01 a
0
2 a
1
1 a
1
2 x
0
1 x
0
2 x
1
1 x
1
2
2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
2.00 2.00 0.50 0.50 0.8325 0.8325 0.2500 0.2500
2.00 2.00 1.00 0.25 0.8665 0.8261 0.5000 0.1250
4.00 2.00 1.00 0.25 1.4865 0.8580 0.5000 0.1250
4.00 2.00 0.25 1.00 1.4572 0.8914 0.1250 0.5000
7.1.2. Solving the local IHOLDG. We also computed an approximation of
the equilibrium trajectories of the local IHOLDG. This is done by discretizing the time
scale and taking a ﬁnite, but large, time horizon. Doing so, we reduce the problem to
a variational inequality that can be solved with the same algorithm [11]. Figure 7.1
displays two trajectories with diﬀerent initial states x, for the state i = 0 and for
the case where a01 = 4.00, a
0
2 = 2.00, a
1
1 = 1.00, and a
1
2 = 0.25. Note that in this
case, the potential values (equilibrium payoﬀs in the limit game) are V1(0) = 26.5682,
V2(0) = 6.2776, V1(1) = 25.5411, V2(1) = 5.9936, respectively.
(a) x1(t) (b) x2(t)
Fig. 7.1. Optimal trajectories for i = 0 when a01 = 4, a
0
2 = 2, a
1
1 = 1, a
1
2 = 0.25, and ρ = 5%.
Solid line: x1(0) = 4 and x2(0) = 3. Dotted line: x1(0) = 0 and x2(0) = 0.
As expected, we distinctly see that the trajectories are attracted by the turnpike
values given in Table 7.1.
This provides a complete illustration of the results obtained in this paper. The
limit game equilibrium tells the player what they should do in the “slow” time scale;
the local IHOLDG tells them what they could do in the “fast” time scale in order to
be consistent with the long-term equilibrium solution.
7.2. A model of competitive economic growth with climate change
thresholds. A stochastic control approach to climate change modeling has been ad-
vocated in [8] and applied in [10]. These models extended the formalism proposed by
Nordhaus [12] by introducing a stochastic jump process representing sudden switches
in climate or global environment conditions. Nordhaus and Yang proposed in [14] a
deterministic diﬀerential game model which represents the noncooperative behavior
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of diﬀerent groups of nations involved in the climate change process. We propose here
to extend the model by introducing a description of climate dynamics in the form of
discrete modal changes. More precisely let us assume that there exist diﬀerent climate
modes, denoted ξ, which correspond to diﬀerent patterns of the general circulation
which determines climate dynamics. For example, we distinguish the current pattern
(ξ = 0) from a second pattern (ξ = 1) where the thermo-haline circulation has been
stopped and a third pattern (ξ = 2) where, in addition, the West-Antarctic ice sheet
has collapsed (this type of threshold event was considered in the stochastic control
model proposed in [10]).
7.2.1. The model equations. Let us denote the following.
Parameters.
j = 1, . . . ,m the m groups of nations, also called players
μj capital depreciation rate in country j (typically 10% per year)
ν greenhouse gas (GHG) natural elimination rate
ρj long-term discount rate for country j (typically 0.08% per decade)
State variables.
Kj productive capital stock of country j
M GHG concentration
ξ climate mode (discrete value ξ ∈ {0, 1, 2})
Control variables.
Ij investment in productive capital stock of country j
Cj consumption in country j
uj abatement eﬀort in country j
Ej GHG emission in country j
Production and emission functions.
F
ξ(t)
j (Kj , uj) economic output of country; this function is increasing and concave
in Kj , decreasing and concave in uj ; its shape depends on ξ
G
ξ(t)
j (Kj , uj) GHG emissions of country; increasing and convex in Kj , decreasing
and convex in uj ; its shape depends on ξ
State equations.
K˙j(t) = Ij(t)− μjKj(t) capital accumulation process
M˙(t) =
∑
j=1,...,mEj(t)− νM(t) GHG concentration process
Modal jump rates.
qk(M) = limdt→0
P[ξ(t+dt)=|ξ(t)=k]
dt transition rate from mode k to mode 
Constraints.
F
ξ(t)
j (Kj , uj) ≥ Ij(t) + Cj(t) the economic output of country j can be consumed
or saved as an investment
G
ξ(t)
j (Kj , uj) ≤ Ej(t) GHG emissions of country j are bounded below by
the emission function
Payoﬀs.
Jj =
∫∞
0
e−ρjtUj(Cj(t)) dt the long-term welfare of country j; Uj(·) is a utility
function
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Initial conditions.
Kj(0) = K
o
j initial physical capital stock of each nation
M(0) = Mo initial GHG concentration
ξ(0) = 0 initial climate mode
7.2.2. The dynamic game. This model summarizes the situation of economies
where the production activity generates GHG emissions which accumulate and may
trigger a climate modal change. An abatement eﬀort can be made by each country at
a cost represented by a loss of output in the production function. The climate mode
has also a direct inﬂuence, also expressed in terms of loss of output, on the economic
production function. In this model the m groups of nations play a noncooperative
dynamic game where the objective of the player is to reach an equilibrium for the
long-term expected welfare,
Vj(γ; 0,K
o,Mo) = Eγ
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρjtUj(Cj(t)) dt
]
,(7.6)
where γ = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γm) is the vector of piecewise open-loop strategies, and the
expectation is taken with respect to the measure induced by γ and the economic
and climate dynamics described above. This model retains the cost-beneﬁt analysis
framework proposed in [13] and [14] and represents climate change as a stochastic
modal switch process.
7.2.3. The limit game. Notice that this model combines decoupled dynamics
(for the Kj capital stocks) and a fully coupled state equation (for the GHG concen-
tration M). However, M is a “passive” state variable which inﬂuences only the jump
rates. It could be shown (see the paper [3] for a discussion of diﬀerential games with
active and passive variables) that the turnpike property will also hold for diﬀerential
games having this structure.
The model proposed here introduces the cost of climate change as a modiﬁcation
of the economic production function triggered by a random change of climate mode.
The limit game will be a Markov game played over the discrete climate modes and
where the controls are the long-term steady state values of the economies. The lo-
cal IHOLDGs are inﬁnite horizon diﬀerential games representing optimal economic
growth with an adapted reward and zero discount rate.
8. Conclusion. We have considered here a class of hybrid games, under the
piecewise open-loop information structure. We have given conditions under which,
when the time scale ratio between the stochastic jump process and the deterministic
part tend to 0, the Nash equilibrium solutions can be approximated by playing a fam-
ily of auxiliary inﬁnite horizon open-loop diﬀerential games (IHOLDGs). These local
games are constructed using the potential functions obtained from the Markov Nash
equilibrium of a simpliﬁed sequential game. This theory uses the asymptotic stability
properties established for IHOLDGs under the strict diagonal concavity assumption.
These conditions are the usual ones when one deals with Cournot solutions in dynamic
imperfect competition models [16]. The results established in this paper are there-
fore useful for studying dynamic economic competition, when the market conditions
change randomly but relatively seldom, compared with the adjustment speed of the
economic decision variables. As indicated in the introduction we can envision such a
situation in the framework of competitive economic growth with global environmen-
tal impact, like climate change triggered by greenhouse gas emissions, for example.
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The evolution of the environmental state, and therefore the evaluation of the envi-
ronmental damage, is random but evolving slowly. The economies of the world have
the possibility to adjust at a much faster speed than the global environment modi-
ﬁcations (see [8] for a discussion of control models with diﬀerent time scales in the
climate change modeling domain).
Appendix A. Continuity and convergence of the occupation measure.
Let D be the space of functions on [0, 1] that are right-continuous and have left-hand
limits. Adapting results from [1] we prove that the integral
∫ 1
0
e−ρtδ(i, ξ(t, ω)) dt is a
continuous function of ξ(t, ω) in D. Let Λ denote the class of strictly increasing, con-
tinuous mappings from λ(·) : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]. For ζ(·) and ξ(·) in D, deﬁne d(ζ(·), ζ(·))
to be the inﬁmum of the ε > 0 for which there exists in Λ a λ(·) such that
sup
t
|λ(t)− t| ≤ ε(A.1)
and
sup
t
|ζ(t)− ξ(λ(t))| ≤ ε.(A.2)
We are now ready to prove that under the norm d, the function∫ 1
0
e−ρtδ(i, ξ(t, ω)) dt
is continuous. We know that ξ(·, ω) has at most countably many discontinuities. Say
that ξ(·, ω) has N discontinuities. Recall that ξ(·, ω) takes value in I = {1, 2, . . . , p}.
Therefore, given ξ(·, ω) ∈ D for any ξ(·, ω˜) ∈ D such that d(ξ(·, ω), ξ(·, ω˜)) < ε <
1, both ξ(·, ω) and ξ(·, ω˜) must have the same sequence of jumps since otherwise
d(ξ(·, ω), ξ(·, ω˜)) ≥ 1. Let {t1, . . . , tN} (respectively, {t˜1, . . . , t˜N}) be the jump times
of ξ(·, ω) (respectively, ξ(·, ω˜)). By deﬁnition of the norm |tn − t˜n| < ε for all n ∈
{1, . . . , N}. We have therefore∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
0
e−ρt (δ(i, ξ(t, ω))− δ(i, ξ(t, ω˜))) dt
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∫ 1
0
|δ(i, ξ(t, ω))− δ(i, ξ(t, ω˜))| dt
≤ N(p− 1)ε.(A.3)
Since p and N are ﬁnite and ε can be taken as small as desired, the continuity is
proved.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. For ξ(0) = i, let us consider in the limit game G0 and
for a game Gε, the probability to have no jump in the interval [0, t] induced by P [x˜]
and Pε[σ
ε(x˜)], respectively. For the limit game G0 this probability is given by
P0[t, 0, i, i] = e−
∫ t
0
qii(x
i) ds
.(A.4)
For the game Gε, under the strategy σε(x˜)] this probability is given by
Pε[t, 0, i, i] = e−
∫ t
0
qii(x(s)) ds,(A.5)
which can be rewritten as
Pε[t, 0, i, i] = e−
∫ t
0
qii(x
i) ds−
∫ min(t,εθ)
0
(qii(x(s))−qii(xi)) ds−
∫ t
min(t,εθ)
(qii(x(s))−qii(xi)) ds
.
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As the jump rates are bounded over X, the second integral in the expression above
converges to 0 when ε → 0. When ε → 0, the absolute value of the integral in the
third term is bounded by ηt, which can be made as small as desired by choosing θ
suﬃciently large. Only the ﬁrst term remains in the exponent, and this corresponds
to (A.5). Therefore this establishes the convergence of Pε[t, 0, i, i] to P0[t, 0, i, i] when
ε→ 0.
We can prove similarly that the probability Pε[t, 1, i, k] of having ξ(t) = k and
having exactly one jump in the interval [0, t], induced by σε(x˜) for the game Gε,
converges to the probability P0[t, 1, i, k] of having ξ(t) = k with exactly one jump in
the interval [0, t], induced by x˜ for the game G0. P0[t, 1, i, k] is given by
P0[t, 1, i, k] =
∫ t
0
qik(x
i)e
−
∫ s
0
qii(x
i) dυ
e
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x
k) dυ
ds,(A.6)
whereas the probability Pε[t, 1, i, k] is given by
Pε[t, 1, i, k] =
∫ t
0
qik(x(s))e
−
∫ s
0
qii(x(υ)) dυe
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x(υ)) dυ ds.(A.7)
For a given t, if ε is small enough we have εθ < t/2 and thus can write
∣∣Pε[t, 1, i, k]− P0[t, 1, i, k]∣∣
≤
∫ εθ
0
∣∣∣∣qik(x(s))e−
∫ s
0
qii(x(υ)) dυe
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x(υ)) dυ−qik(xi)e−
∫ s
0
qii(x
i) dυ
e
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x
k) dυ
∣∣∣∣ ds
+
∫ t
t−εθ
∣∣∣∣qik(x(s))e−
∫ s
0
qii(x(υ)) dυe
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x(υ)) dυ−qik(xi)e−
∫ s
0
qii(x
i) dυ
e
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x
k) dυ
∣∣∣∣ ds
+
∫ t−εθ
εθ
∣∣∣∣qik(x(s))e−
∫ s
0
qii(x(υ)) dυe
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x(υ)) dυ−qik(xi)e−
∫ s
0
qii(x
i) dυ
e
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x
k) dυ
∣∣∣∣ ds.
The ﬁrst two terms tend to zero as ε tends to zero, whereas the last term can be
rewritten as
∫ t−εθ
εθ
∣∣∣∣(qik(x(s))− qik(xi)) e−
∫ s
0
qii(x(υ)) dυe
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x(υ)) dυ
− qik(xi)
(
e
−
∫ s
0
qii(x
i) dυ
e
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x
k) dυ − e−
∫ s
0
qii(x(υ)) dυe
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x(υ)) dυ
)∣∣∣∣ ds
≤
∫ t−εθ
εθ
∣∣qik(x(s))− qik(xi)∣∣
∣∣∣∣e−
∫ s
0
qii(x(υ)) dυe
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x(υ)) dυ
∣∣∣∣ ds
+
∫ t−εθ
εθ
∣∣qik(xi)∣∣
∣∣∣∣e−
∫ s
0
qii(x
i) dυ
e
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x
k) dυ − e−
∫ s
0
qii(x(υ)) dυe
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x(υ)) dυ
∣∣∣∣ ds.
When ε tends to zero, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of the inequality above
can be made as small as desired, choosing θ suﬃciently big. The second term can be
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rewritten as∫ t−εθ
εθ
∣∣∣∣e−
∫ s
0
qii(x
i) dυ
e
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x
k) dυ − e−
∫ s
0
qii(x(υ)) dυe
−
∫ t
s
qkk(x(υ)) dυ
∣∣∣∣ ds
=
∫ t−εθ
εθ
∣∣∣∣e−
∫ εθ
0
qii(x
i) dυ
e
−
∫ s
εθ
qii(x
i) dυ
e
−
∫ s+εθ
s
qkk(x
k) dυ
e
−
∫ t
s+εθ
qkk(x
k) dυ
− e−
∫ εθ
0
qii(x(υ)) dυe
−
∫ s
εθ
qii(x(υ)) dυe
−
∫ s+εθ
s
qkk(x(υ)) dυe
−
∫ t
s+εθ
qkk(x(υ)) dυ
∣∣∣∣ ds
≤
∫ t−εθ
εθ
∣∣∣∣e−
∫ εθ
0
qii(x
i) dυ
e
−
∫ s+εθ
s
qkk(x
k) dυ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣e−
∫ s
εθ
qii(x
i) dυ
e
−
∫ t
s+εθ
qkk(x
k) dυ − e−
∫ s
εθ
qii(x(υ)) dυe
−
∫ t
s+εθ
qkk(x(υ)) dυ
∣∣∣∣ ds
+
∫ t−εθ
εθ
∣∣∣∣e−
∫ s
εθ
qii(x(υ)) dυe
−
∫ t
s+εθ
qkk(x(υ)) dυ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣e−
∫ εθ
0
qii(x
i) dυ
e
−
∫ s+εθ
s
qkk(x
k) dυ − e−
∫ εθ
0
qii(x(υ)) dυe
−
∫ s+εθ
s
qkk(x(υ)) dυ
∣∣∣∣ ds.
By continuity of the exponential and q(·) functions and (4.2), this expression can be
made as small as desired, when ε tends to zero. We can now extend this approach via
an induction argument. Suppose that for n−1, Pε[t, n−1, i, k] tends to P0[t, n−1, i, k]
when ε tends to zero. We have
Pε[t, n, i, k] =
∑
l =k
∫ t
0
Pε[s, n− 1, i, l]Pε[t− s, 1, l, k] ds.(A.8)
Using the result proved for n = 1, we can easily conclude that the following also holds:
lim
ε→0
Pε[t, n, i, k] =
∑
l =k
∫ t
0
P0[s, n− 1, i, l]P0[t− s, 1, l, k] ds = P0[t, n, i, k].(A.9)
We can thus prove, by induction, that for each ﬁnite n , Pε[t, n, i, k] tends to P0[t, n, i, k]
when ε tends to zero. Knowing that the probability of having more than n jumps
tends to zero as n tends to inﬁnity, it follows that
Pεπ
−1
t1,...,tk
⇒ Pπ−1t1,...,tk ,(A.10)
and this establishes the convergence result (4.5), as was indicated at the beginning of
the proof.
Appendix B. Results of [6]. In [6] the single player case is solved and the
convergence result used in this paper as Theorem 4.4 is based on the following as-
sumption.
Assumption 7. For any vector v = {v(i)}i∈I consider the family of deterministic
optimal control problems
Hi(θ, xo, v) = inf
1
θ
∫ θ
0
(
Li(x(t), u(t)) +
∑
i∈I
qik(x(t))v(k)
)
,
dx(t)
dt
= f i(x(t), u(t)),
u(t) ∈ U i,
x(0) = xo.
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One assumes that there exist two constants A > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1], and for each i ∈ I
a function Hi(v), such that for each i ∈ I, xo ∈ X, and v in a bounded set Ω
|Hi(θ, xo, v)−Hi(v)| ≤ 1
θα
.(B.1)
Under this assumption Theorem 4.4 is established.
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